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LETTER DATED 2 JULY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

During the visit of your Personal Envoy to Islamabad, several suggestions for effectively addressing the security crisis in South Asia were made by Pakistan. I am enclosing herewith the text of those suggestions, which were also shared with your Envoy.

Mr. Alvaro de Soto would have briefed you on his in-depth discussions in Islamabad and conveyed to you our sincere desire to cooperate fully with the United Nations to reduce tensions and find a peaceful solution to the root causes, notably the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

We request you to encourage, facilitate and support the development of a comprehensive framework to address the interlinked issues of peace, security, conventional imbalance, confidence-building, conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia.

The construction of a regime for nuclear and conventional arms stability in South Asia will require careful and patient efforts to develop a consensus. This is unlikely to be accomplished by India and Pakistan themselves. Nor can such a regime be imposed. It will have to evolve through a combination of simultaneous multilateral and bilateral efforts.

For its part, Pakistan is ready to engage with India and the international community to promote such a process, which in the first instance should accord priority to the avoidance of conflict, the promotion of nuclear and conventional restraint and stabilization between Pakistan and India, as well as the peaceful and just resolution of the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmad KAMAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

PAKISTAN'S POSITION AND PROPOSALS

- Pakistan favours a serious and sustained endeavour by the United Nations to defuse the security crisis in South Asia, which threatens global peace and security.

- Pakistan wishes to engage constructively with the UN, the international community and India to overcome the security crisis in South Asia.

- Pakistan is committed to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

- India's decision to induct nuclear weapons announced in the national agenda on 18 March was executed with lightening speed. India conducted its nuclear tests ranging from thermo-nuclear weapons to tactical weapons on 11 and 13 May 1998, declared itself as the sixth nuclear weapon state, affirmed that it had the "big bomb" and then threatened Pakistan with use of nuclear weapons and held out a threat of nuclear blackmail to impose a military solution in Kashmir.

- In the absence of a credible response from international community or any assurances to Pakistan against the nuclear and conventional threats, we were obliged to act in self-defence to restore the strategic balance, preserve our security and the maintenance of peace in the region.

- The Prime Minister kept the Secretary General and the Permanent Members of the Security Council fully informed of the impending breach of peace signaled by the Indian announcement to induct nuclear weapons. Regrettably, our repeated warnings and appeals went un-noticed and un-heeded.

- The P-5, the Security Council and the G-8 woke up to the nuclearization of South Asia only after our nuclear tests which had prevented or at least reduced the imminence of a grave breach of peace in South Asia.

- Our position on all aspects of the situation and the warranted approach was reflected in our Security Council statement on 6 June 1998.

- We believe that a comprehensive approach to the inter-linked issues of peace, security, confidence building, conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament must be evolved by the international community.

- We look forward to the institution of a process for peace and rapprochement in South Asia.

- Such a process should be encouraged, facilitated, assisted and monitored by the United Nations.

- The Secretary General will have Pakistan's full support and cooperation.

- The Security Council must play an active role and exercise his authority, particularly under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, to prevent the situation in our region from deteriorating further and for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

- Jammu and Kashmir lies at the heart of the problems between India and Pakistan. The denial by India to the Kashmiri people of their inalienable right to self-determination, as provided for in the Security Council's resolutions, remains the central issue, that has over the past 50 years engendered conflicts and tensions between Pakistan and India.

- The Security Council Resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir must be implemented.

- Jammu and Kashmir is not merely a territorial dispute. It involves the Kashmiri people. It also equally involves the United Nations. We have stood by the Kashmiri people in their demand for the implementation of Security Council's resolutions. We have, therefore, stood by the United Nations.

- The Jammu and Kashmir question has legal, security and humanitarian dimensions. These facets are interlinked and require simultaneous engagement, in order to promote a just solution.

- The Kashmiri people by their massive and spontaneous uprising over the past 9 years have rejected Indian occupation. They are demanding their right to self-determination, as provided in the Security Council resolutions. These resolutions set the historical perspective and provide a legal basis for the settlement of the Kashmir issue.

- Kashmir has now become a nuclear flash-point. Indian leadership has been talking of a "proactive" policy including "hot pursuit" across the Line of Control. India is violating the Line of Control using heavy artillery. It has caused civilian casualties.

- There is a major Indian military build-up, accompanied by an intensification of repression against the Kashmiri people.

- The United Nations also needs to take immediate cognizance of the denial of fundamental human rights to the Kashmiri people and provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced Kashmiri, fleeing Indian oppression.

- Regrettably, the international community has not been able to address effectively the

problem of Jammu and Kashmiri. It is an international problem which cannot be exclusively relegated to the bilateral plane.

- Pakistan is, however, prepared to engage in a serious, substantive and result-oriented dialogue with India, to effectively address the Jammu and Kashmiri issue.

- It was at Pakistan's suggestion that we were able to resume the Foreign Secretary level talks with India last year. These talks broke down due to backtracking by India, on the agreement reached on 23 June 1997 between the two Foreign Secretaries.

- On 11 June 1998, we proposed resumption of Foreign Secretary level talks and invited the Indian Foreign Secretary to come to Islamabad on 20 June 1998.

- India rejected our offer to hold Foreign Secretary level talks prior to the Colombo SAARC Summit.

- During the last year, our Prime Minister met Prime Minister Gujral four times. We had hoped that it would be possible to promote a Pakistan-India dialogue for peace and rapprochement in South Asia.

- These hopes have been dashed by policies and actions of the new Indian Government.

- Nonetheless, we intend to persevere with patience to promote a credible, serious and substantive Pakistan-India peace process.

- On 23 June 1998, our Prime Minister sent a letter to Prime Minister Vajpayee affirming his readiness to meet with him during the SAARC Summit at Colombo next month.

- We believe that it is important for Pakistan and India to address the issues of peace and security and Jammu and Kashmir on a priority basis.

- Under the rubric of "peace and security" which is the agreed item on the agenda of talks between Pakistan and India, we have suggested that both sides give urgent attention to the following:

  a) Avoidance of conflict.
  b) Nuclear and conventional restraint and stabilization measures.
  c) Confidence building.
  d) Jammu and Kashmir.

- We have announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and revived our offer to India to conclude a bilateral test ban agreement, which would be an important step at mutual confidence building.

- We also want to address the Jammu and Kashmir issue in all its aspects.

- We have also proposed the conclusion of a Non-aggression Pact between Pakistan and India, on the basis of a just settlement of Jammu and Kashmiri dispute.

- The United Nations, particularly the Secretary General and the Security Council, should facilitate the process of peace and rapprochement in South Asia.

- The Secretary General should consider taking the following steps in this regard:

  a) Visit the region, particularly Pakistan and India, at an early date.
  b) Appoint a Special Representative for Jammu and Kashmiri.
  c) Strengthen and enhance the mandate of UNMOGIP.
  d) Monitor closely violations of the Line of Control and report them on a regular basis to the Security Council.
  e) Create international awareness about the important role UNMOGIP is playing to prevent a major conflagration in Kashmir.
  f) Maintain close contacts with Pakistan and India to assist progress in their bilateral talks which should be reported periodically to the Security Council.

- Neither the Council Resolution 1172 nor the G-8 Ministerial Communique, address the grave security situation in South Asia on a pragmatic basis.

- We favour a comprehensive approach to the interlinked issues of peace, security, confidence-building, conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament.

- In 1974, India exploded the myth of the "Smiling Buddha". Its first casualty was Pakistan.

- For the next 24 years, Pakistan's security, indeed its very survival and existence, faced a double jeopardy.

- On the one hand was the threat posed to our national survival by India's unbridled pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions.

- On the other were the sanctions imposed by our friends in the name of nuclear non-proliferation, which increasingly and rapidly even denied us the means of a conventional defence.

- Pakistan's conduct during these 24 years, attests to the fact that perhaps no other country, ever pursued, more vigorously the goals of nuclear non-proliferation.

- Since 1974, Pakistan launched a major diplomatic campaign to prevent nuclear

proliferation in South Asia.

- We presented a series of proposals to spare our region from the specter of a nuclear conflict.

- These inter-alia included proposals for:

  - A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia - 1974;
  - A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition of manufacture of nuclear weapons - 19789;
  - Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities - 1979;
  - Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan - 1979;
  - Simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards - 1979;
  - A bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty - 1987;
  - A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone - 1994.

- It was India, which vetoed each of these initiatives.

- Regrettably proliferation has taken place in South Asia, which is today nuclearized. Responsibility for this unfortunate development lies squarely on the shoulders of India.

- It is imperative that the international community acts effectively to prevent the dangers of a nuclear conflict in South Asia.

- We do not wish to engage in a nuclear arms race. We are willing to work towards evolving a stable deterrence regime which forecloses the possibility of an arms race.

- The establishment and maintenance of a stable deterrence regime will also require agreement(s) to maintain balance in the level and disposition of conventional forces between India and Pakistan.

- We would be happy to enter into discussions bilaterally or together with major powers for establishing additional confidence-building measures.

- The construction of a regime for nuclear and conventional arms stability in South Asia will require careful and patient efforts to evolve a consensus. This is unlikely to be accomplished by India and Pakistan themselves. Nor can such a regime be imposed on India and Pakistan by the Security Council or the G-8. It will have to be evolved through a combination of simultaneous multilateral and bilateral efforts.

- In our view there are four priority "regional" objectives and one "global" objective which can and should be promoted in the context of recent development in South Asia.

- The four regional objectives are:

a) Avoidance of war,
b) Nuclear stabilization by India and Pakistan,
c) Conventional balance,
d) Jammu and Kashmir

a) Avoidance of War

- This is the first priority. The Indian proposal for "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons is disingenuous. It is designed to make it "safe" for India to use or threaten Paksitan with its convnetional superiority. Pakistan has proposed a Non-Aggression Agreement, on the basis of a solution of the Kashmir dispute. Perhaps, as a first step, the two countries, could (a) solemnly reaffirm their commitment to non-use of force as prescribed by the UN Charter; (b) undertake to create transparency in military preparations and (c) discuss further CBMs e.g. the creation of a "risk reduction Centre" (as between U.S. and Russia).

- The UN Secretary General and others should help in de-escalating tensions, etc.

b) Nuclear Stabilization by India and Pakistan

- Pakistan is not interested in a nuclear arms race. Pakistan has not declared itself a "Nuclear Weapon State". Of course, as the Indians have noted, the "reality" that India is now a nuclear weapon state cannot be changed by P-5 or Security Council's rejection of their "status".

- Pakistan is preapred to enter into a bilateral and/or multilateral dialogue to evolve an agreement for the maintenance of strategic parity and stable deterrence (a nuclear restraint regime) between India and Pakistan, at any agreed level. But we will not accept a position of strategic inequality vis-a-vis India.

- We must assume that some weaponization has already occurred. The two countries should be encouraged to restrain their build-up of warheads to the minimum and refrain from the deployment of missiles.

NPT

- India has consistently and vigorously opposed NPT and will obviously continue to do so. Under the circumstances, Paksitan will have to rely on nuclear deterrence. It is important to build comprehensive arrangements for peace and security with India including a conventional arms balance and the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

- We are for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

CTBT

- As regards the CTBT, Pakistan had voted for the Treaty.

- We have declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

- We have offered a bilateral or regional test ban to India as an important confidence building measure, in the first instance.

- India has rejected our offer of a bilateral test ban.

- Our position on CTBT will be shaped by an assessment and analysis of our security requirements in the context of the nuclear and conventional threat posed by India.

FMCT

- FMCT is an issue which should only be discussed in the competent body, namely, the Conference on Disarmament.

- In the CD most members of the G-21, including India, have agreed that FMCT negotaitions should be one element of broader negotiations on "nuclear disarmament", namely, an Ad Hoc Committee with 3 Working Groups dealing with (a) as a first step, a Convention committing all States to the elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) negotiations on a programme for nuclear disarmment; and (c) FMCT. Pakistan supports this approach also.

- The P-5 and those interested in FMCT must first ask India and determine whether it would enter the talks as a nuclear or non-nuclear weapon State (since obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear States will be different, for example, on verification and "execution").

- We also need to evaluate whether India will reverse its nuclear programe, stand-still or, as threatened, move forward towards full weaponization and deployment of its nuclear capability.

- The Indians have claimed that with the new designs they have tested, they can exponentially enlarge the number and yield of their nuclear weapons with available stockpiles.

Missile Development

- The P-5 and the Security Council have called for a halt in the development of missiles.

The indigenous development of missiles is not proscribed by any intenrational agreement and is largely non-verifiable. Pakistan cannot accept a situation of inferiority in missile capabilities. India has conducted 20 missiles tests, Pakistan only one.

- This disaprity leads to strategic instability and therefore, increases the risk of conflict.

- We are prepared, however, to discuss the issue of mutual (India-Paksitan) restraint in the production and deployment of missiles.

c) Conventional Balance

- A stable deterrence regime will also require an agreement, or agreements, to maintain balance in the level and disposition of conventional forces between India and Pakistan.

- We would be happy to enter into discussions bilaterally with India and/or together with the major powers to establish new confidence-building measures, "command and control" and monitoring of implementation fo CBMs.

- Conventional "balance" between India and Pakistan will be a necessary complement for nuclear stabilization.

- The international community particualrly P-5 should persuade India to exercise restraint and forego acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems which will further de-stabilize the situation.

d) Jammu and Kashmir

- As mentioned before this is a priority objective at the regional level and must be addressed as such.

Preserving the Global Non-Proliferation Regime

- Pakistan is aware of the concern that the nuclear tests and weaponization in South Asia could destablize the entire nucelar non-prloliferation regime. We are prepared to work with the international community, to avoid this, but only as part of a comprehensive approach which also addresses our security requirements.

- Pakistan has never transferred sensitive technology. We are pained by irresponsible statements regarding the "Islamic bomb". Such assertions should not become self-fulfilling prophecies.

- The Secretary General may rest assured of Pakistan's fullest cooperation and support in reducing the tensions and risk of conflict in our region.